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THE SCOOP ON BETTY BOOP: A PROPOSAL TO
LIMIT OVERREACHING TRADEMARKS
Lee B. Burgunder *
The Ninth Circuit temporarily stunned marketers in 2011 when it
ruled that Betty Boop did not serve as a trademark on merchandise due to
aesthetic functionality and because protection would conflict with the copyright system. The opinion endangered merchandising rights in all trademarks and jeopardized the duration of trademark rights in images and media characters. The court soon withdrew the decision and substituted it
with one that denied protection on technical grounds, leaving the controversies for another day. This article demonstrates that the court’s apprehension about copyrights made sense, and proposes a new approach to distinguish when copyrighted images might also serve as trademarks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In February 2011, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that the purported owners of trademark rights in the character Betty
Boop could not prevent another company from authorizing the production
of merchandise, such as t-shirts, bearing two Betty Boop images. 1 The majority opinion was based on two very controversial conclusions: (1) the use
of a trademark on merchandise is aesthetically functional, and thus noninfringing, when consumers purchase that merchandise to publicly display
their affection for the trademark; 2 and (2) copyrighted images cannot serve
as trademarks after copyright protection has terminated. 3 A storm of protest ensued, and the panel quickly withdrew the opinion and substituted it

* Professor of Business Law & Public Policy, California Polytechnic State University, San
Luis Obispo. J.D., Stanford Law School, 1981; M.B.A., Stanford Graduate School of Business,
1981; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1977.
1. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958, 968 (9th Cir. 2011).
2. See id. at 1123–24.
3. See id. at 1124.
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with one that denied protection simply on the grounds that the plaintiff
could not satisfactorily prove that Betty Boop’s image served as a trademark. 4 By denying Betty Boop’s trademark status, the panel found a way
to avoid both of the issues that clearly troubled it but that raised such heated rebukes when it attempted to address them. 5 Unfortunately, these problems are likely to someday resurface and next time, the court will probably be unable to hide.6
The Ninth Circuit panel was right to be concerned about extending
trademark protection to media characters such as Betty Boop. After all, unless something is done, the Walt Disney Company (“Disney”), for example,
will be able to use the trademark system to prevent companies from displaying images of Mickey Mouse long after its copyright expires. 7 This
result would violate public policy and must be addressed.8 However, the
court’s original reasoning was incorrect and over-extensive, which is why it
provoked such an outcry of opposition. 9 For instance, the consequences of
the decision would have prevented entities ranging from Nike to Yale University from exclusively licensing their trademarks for t-shirts or key
chains. 10 It also would have caused trademarked images, such as the one
used by Starbucks, to fall into the public domain after expiration of their
copyright term. 11 Thus, the court will need a more coherent and focused
approach the next time it addresses a trademark merchandising situation
involving copyrighted material.

4. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. 654 F.3d 958; see also Dick Schulze, Betty Boop in Wonderland or Through the Licensing Glass, 19 NEV. LAW. 16 (2011) (providing an example of a commentator’s critical view).
5. See Schulze, supra note 4, at 16.
6. Cf. Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (regarding the issue of using trademarks to protect characters after copyrights
have expired, the court stated, “[t]his provocative question need not be reached, since plaintiff
does not seek to establish exclusive trademark rights in the characters themselves but only to protect its limited right to use specific illustrations of those characters.”) (emphasis added).
7. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058(a), 1059 (2006) (stating that the registrant can retain a federal trademark as long as it files an affidavit of use after five years and requisite renewals every ten
years); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2006) (stating that an incontestable trademark can only be
cancelled for limited reasons, such as where the mark has become generic or is functional).
8. See infra Parts III.A., IV.A.
9. See Schulze, supra note 4, at 16.
10. See infra Part III.C.
11. A trademark owner can renew a trademark registration every ten years by filing an
affidavit demonstrating that the mark is being used in commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059.
After a trademark becomes incontestable, protection can only be lost on limited grounds, such as
where the mark has become generic or is functional. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (regarding generic
marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (2006) (regarding functional marks).
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This article argues that trademark protection should not be extended to
the overall general appearances of images and characters that are primarily
developed for copyright purposes. This approach would allow trademark
merchandising for names such as Nike, and would permit Starbucks to keep
its trademark forever.12 However, Disney would no longer be able to lay
claim to all images recognized as Mickey Mouse. 13 Instead, Disney could only enjoy trademark rights to particular individual images that are consistently
used as trademarks to identify it as the source of products and services.14
Such a result is consistent with the ways courts treat trademark protection for
famous celebrities, 15 which makes sense given the fame of many media characters. Of course, Disney will likely object, and at first, some confusion may
result. Nevertheless, in the long run, this approach will preserve the goals of
trademarks while preventing policy conflicts with copyrights.
II. PERTINENT FACTS OF THE BETTY BOOP LITIGATION
Betty Boop is a well known cartoon character whose appearance juxtaposes a childish demeanor with a sophisticated air by placing on top of a
“very small body,” “a large round baby face with big eyes,” a small nose,
and a carefully tailored coiffure.16 Max Fleischer created Betty Boop and
served as President of Fleischer Studios (“Fleischer”), which developed
several films based on the character beginning in 1930.17
In 1941, Fleischer Studios dissolved after selling all of its assets and
intellectual property rights to Paramount Pictures, Inc. (“Paramount”). 18 In
the early 1970s, Max Fleischer’s family was determined to revive the
Fleischer cartoon business, and so it reestablished Fleischer Studios and
embarked on efforts to repurchase the interests in the Betty Boop character. 19 This was not a simple task since the intellectual property rights had

12. A trademark owner can renew a trademark registration every ten years by filing an
affidavit demonstrating that the mark is being used in commerce. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1059. After a trademark becomes incontestable, protection can only be lost on limited grounds, such as
where the mark has become generic or is functional. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (regarding generic
marks); 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(8) (regarding functional marks).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. Id.
15. See infra Part IV.B.
16. See generally Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 961 (9th Cir.
2011) (providing the underlying history of Betty Boop’s creation and ownership).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
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been transferred several times over the thirty-year period. 20 Of most importance, Paramount assigned its rights to the Betty Boop films in 1955 to
UM&M TV Corp. (“UM&M”) 21 but retained the copyright interests in the
separate Betty Boop character. 22 Fleischer successfully acquired the interests in the films that originated from UM&M through a series of transfers. 23 However, Paramount transferred its copyright interests in the Betty
Boop character to Harvey Films, 24 and what happened to these rights, or
whether they were even preserved, remains unclear.25
Beginning in 1972, Fleischer authorized numerous companies to produce merchandise bearing images of Betty Boop. 26 In 2002, Art & Vintage
Entertainment Licensing Agency, Inc. (“A.V.E.L.A.”), which was not one
of the companies working with Fleischer, registered copyrights for two restored Betty Boop movie posters and then licensed images from the posters, including the Betty Boop character, for use on merchandise such as tshirts and handbags. 27 In 2006, Fleischer sued A.V.E.L.A. for copyright
and trademark infringement. 28 Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
agreed that Fleischer could not win on the copyright claims since it could
not demonstrate that it owned the copyright to the Betty Boop character.29
The trademark claims, though, proved to be more challenging. 30 For example, Fleischer had several federal registrations for the word mark “Betty
Boop,” which appeared on the A.V.E.L.A. merchandise. 31 However, since
the registrations were not incontestable, 32 this opened the door for the

20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See Fleischer Studios, 654 F.3d at 963.
23. See id. at 961.
24. See id. at 964–65.
25. See id. at 965. Fleischer argued at trial that it purchased these rights from Harvey Films,
but the district court ruled for A.V.E.L.A., and Fleischer failed to raise the issue on appeal. Id.
26. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1157 (C.D. Cal.
2009), aff’d, 636 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 2011), withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958.
27. See id. at 1159–60.
28. See id. at 1160.
29. See Fleischer Studios, 654 F.3d at 962–65.
30. See id. at 967.
31. See id.
32. Fleischer did not submit any evidence that it filed the required affidavit for incontestability, stating that the mark had been in continuous use for five consecutive years after registration. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. The Ninth Circuit refused to recognize
additional evidence that might have established incontestability. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654
F.3d at 967.

06. BURGUNDER (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

12/29/2012 7:44 PM

THE SCOOP ON BETTY BOOP

261

courts to disagree about the validity of the registrations. 33 The issues regarding the word marks, though, are not the subject of this article. Rather,
the focus is on how the courts approached Fleischer’s trademark rights to
the Betty Boop image.
The district court judge granted summary judgment for A.V.E.L.A. on
the trademark image claim. 34 Although Fleischer had evidence that it
owned a federally registered trademark for an image of Betty Boop, the district court judge refused to consider it because Fleischer submitted evidence of such too late. 35 Thus, Fleischer had to establish common law
trademark rights by demonstrating that it was the owner of the mark and
that the mark had acquired “secondary meaning.” 36 In other words,
Fleischer had to establish that the image actually represented the source of
goods or services bearing it. The district court dispensed with the topic
based on the issue of ownership, which requires proof of first use in commerce. 37 Since Fleischer could not establish whether other companies may
have sold Betty Boop merchandise prior to its use in 1972, it failed to prove
that it owned the common law trademark rights to the image. 38 The court
did note, however, that when litigants are able to prove trademark ownership in cartoon characters or other media images, they typically can also
establish secondary meaning. 39 Thus, it acknowledged that under the appropriate circumstances, companies can establish trademark rights to the

33. See Fleischer Studios, 654 F.3d at 966–67.
34. See Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1171–72.
35. See Fleischer Studios, 654 F.3d at 965–66.
36. See, e.g., Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (“To
establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.”) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. E
(1995)); see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992) (“Secondary meaning is used generally to indicate that a mark or dress ‘has come through use to be
uniquely associated with a specific source.’”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529
U.S. 205, 211 n.* (2000) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court has suggested that in the context
of non-word marks, it might be better to use the phrase “acquired meaning” “since non-word
marks ordinarily have no primary meaning.”).
37. See Fleischer Studios, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 1168 (quoting Quicksilver, Inc. v. Kymsta
Corp., 466 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2006)) (“Trademark rights are acquired by the party that first
uses a mark in connection with the sale of goods.”).
38. See id.
39. See id. at 1168 n.23 (“The Court recognizes that courts that have upheld trademark
rights in the physical appearance of characters have generally found secondary meaning associated with the characters.”).
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general appearance of characters, which may prevent others from using
those characters on merchandise due to a likelihood of confusion. 40
On appeal, the parties raised numerous arguments regarding the district court’s trademark decision as to Betty Boop’s image, including issues
about federal registration, ownership of common law trademark rights, and
whether A.V.E.L.A. infringed upon the mark. 41 Nonetheless, the court initially ignored these arguments, claiming they were all “mooted by controlling precedent that neither party cited . . . .” 42 This precedent was International Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., a case involving a
jewelry manufacturer that displayed the Job’s Daughters’ fraternal insignia
on its products without permission from the trademark owner.43 In that
case, the court stated, “[t]rademark law does not prevent a person from copying so-called ‘functional’ features of a product which constitute the actual
benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a product.” 44
In Job’s Daughters, the court noted that consumers often purchase merchandise bearing trademarks to indicate their allegiance to the brands or organizations displayed and not because they perceive any connection to, or
sponsorship by, the trademark owners. 45 Thus, trademark protection does
not extend to these kinds of merchandising practices because the actual benefit that consumers seek in the transaction typically is the trademark itself. 46
Based on the logic of Job’s Daughters, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
Betty Boop name and image were “functional aesthetic components of the
product, not trademarks.” 47 In support of this conclusion, the court noted
that Betty Boop was a prominent feature of the merchandise and that
A.V.E.L.A. did nothing to falsely indicate that Fleischer officially spon-

40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. at 1168.
See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 636 F.3d at 1122, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958.
Id. at 1122.
See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 914 (9th Cir.

1980).
44. Id. at 917.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 918 (“Our jewelry, clothing, and cars are emblazoned with inscriptions
showing the organizations we belong to, the schools we attend, the landmarks we have visited,
the sports teams we support, the beverages we imbibe. Although these inscriptions frequently
include names and emblems that are also used as collective marks or trademarks, it would be naive to conclude that the name or emblem is desired because consumers believe that the product
somehow originated with or was sponsored by the organization the name or emblem signifies.”).
47. See Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958
(quoting Job’s Daughters, 633 F.2d at 920).
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sored the items. 48 The court determined that under these circumstances,
there could be no infringement. 49
Obviously, trademark owners were alarmed by this decision because
it seemingly gave merchandise manufacturers a green light to apply marks
to their wares without paying licensing fees. 50 However, the court did not
stop there. 51 The court also objected to Fleischer’s attempt to use trademark law as a copyright substitute. 52 In this regard, the court cited Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.,53 which involved an accusation of reverse passing off 54 with films that were no longer copyrighted.55
In particular, Fox accused Dastar of violating its trademark when it copied
its Crusades television series (after the copyright had ended) and repackaged it into a shorter series without attributing the source of the original
video material. 56 The Supreme Court noted that the “rights of a patentee or
copyright holder are part of a carefully crafted bargain,” 57 and denied the
trademark claim because “in construing the Lanham Act, [the Court had]
been ‘careful to caution against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and
related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent and copyright.” 58 Based on these considerations, the Ninth Circuit stated, “[i]f we
ruled that A.V.E.L.A.’s depictions of Betty Boop infringed Fleischer’s
trademarks, the Betty Boop character would essentially never enter the
public domain.” 59
This aspect of the Court’s ruling also raised fears because many
trademarks include copyrighted material.60 For instance, the Starbucks
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See Deborah S. Cohn, Mere Ornamentation and Aesthetic Functionality: Causing
Confusion in the Betty Boop Case?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 1218, 1222 (2011) (discussing the
problems posed by the Ninth Circuit Betty Boop case that was later overturned).
51. See Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124.
52. See id.
53. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
54. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 27 n.1 (“Passing off . . . occurs when a producer misrepresents his own goods or services as someone else’s. “Reverse passing off” . . . is the opposite:
The producer misrepresents someone else’s goods or services as his own.”).
55. See id. at 27.
56. See id.
57. Id. at 33 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–
51 (1989)).
58. Id. at 39 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001)).
59. Fleischer Studios, 636 F.3d at 1124, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958.
60. See Jonathan Bailey, Trademark, Copyright and Logos, PLAGIARISM TODAY (Aug.
12, 2010), http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2010/08/12/trademark-copyright-and-logos/.
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logo, which serves as a trademark, also includes pictorial works subject to
copyright protection. 61 When the copyright expires, will any company be
able to attach the well known graphic to their products despite the very
likely possibility of confusion? 62 Even if the images within a trademark are
not registered with the Copyright Office, they still bear automatic copyright
protection if they are original and minimally creative. 63 So, if the Nike
Swoosh meets these standards, will the company lose its exclusive rights to
use the Swoosh for brand identification once the copyright term expires?
Would this mean that Tony the Tiger may someday die, at least as a brand
symbol for Kellogg’s?
As one might expect, Fleischer petitioned the court for a rehearing. 64
However, before the court responded to the petition, it withdrew its previous opinion and superseded it with a new decision, thus making a rehearing
unnecessary. 65 The revised decision makes no mention of Job’s Daughters, functionality, or conflicts between trademarks and copyrights.66 Instead, at least with regard to Betty Boop’s image, the court avoided the potentially difficult issues by handling them summarily on procedural
grounds. 67 First, the court determined that the district judge did not abuse
her discretion by excluding Fleischer’s untimely evidence, showing that the
image had been federally registered as a trademark. 68 The court also refused to take judicial notice of the Betty Boop image registration on appeal. 69 Of course, the court still had to consider the possibility that the image served as an unregistered trademark, and if so, whether A.V.E.L.A.’s

61. See STARBUCKS COFFEE, U.S. Registration No. 1,542,775; Starbucks Coffee Siren
Logo, U.S. COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION NO. VA0000875932 (illustrating that the graphic Starbucks logo is protected by both federal trademark and copyright registrations).
62. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). The Copyright Act specifies that the duration
of the copyright term is the life of the author plus seventy years, or in the case of a work made for
hire, ninety-five years after the year of first publication. See id.
63. See id. § 102 (2006) (stating that copyright subsists “in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression”); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that the term “original” under the Copyright Act means the
work is not copied from other works and possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity); 17
U.S.C. §§ 408(a), 412 (2006) (stating that copyright registration is permissive and provides certain benefits, such as the ability to collect statutory damages and attorney’s fees).
64. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 960.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 958.
67. See id. at 966.
68. See id.
69. See id.
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use might cause a likelihood of confusion. 70 But again, the court took the
easy road by ruling that Fleischer did not submit legally sufficient evidence
that the image had attained secondary meaning. 71 Thus, after previously
noting all the thorny issues that trademarks raise with merchandising, especially with respect to copyrighted images, the court found a way to take
cover and leave the battle for another day. 72
The result is unfortunate because the issues are extremely important
and are certain to rise again, but under circumstances that will force the
court to address the obvious concerns. 73 Numerous media companies aggressively guard the copyright and trademark interests in the characters depicted in their works, and unlike Fleischer, leave no procedural stone unturned. 74 Consider, for instance, the attention Disney invests in protecting
its interests in Mickey Mouse. If one is comfortable with the notion that
Mickey Mouse might serve as a distinctive identifier for the source of the
films in which he appears, then the character perhaps may serve as a
trademark. 75 Once that leap is made, it will be easy to demonstrate secondary meaning because five years of exclusive and continuous use provides
prima facie evidence of distinctiveness. 76 Thanks to copyright, no other
company has been allowed to reproduce and use the character on their
wares, except under very special circumstances, for far longer than five

70. A word, symbol, or image may be protected as a trademark without federal registration
by demonstrating that the alleged identifier is inherently distinctive or has attained secondary
meaning. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006). See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 529 U.S. at 210. To prove
infringement, an owner of an unregistered trademark must demonstrate that an unauthorized individual used the mark with knowledge of its previous use as a trademark in a way that is likely to
cause confusion. See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 100 (1918);
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 419 (1916); Lee Burgunder, Trademark Registration of Product Colors: Issues and Answers, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 581, 587 (1986).
Federal registration primarily provides procedural advantages, such as constructive notice of previous use and a presumption of validity. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1072, 1057(b) (2006).
71. See Fleischer Studios, 654 F.3d at 967.
72. See id.
73. See Michael Helfand, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial Characters, 44
STAN. L. REV. 623, 626–27 (1992) (arguing that sophisticated owners will put in place more protective measures for their characters).
74. See id. at 626–28 (describing generally the legal actions media companies take to protect the copyright and trademark interest in the characters depicted in their works).
75. See DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(“[O]ur reading of the cases in this circuit shows that where the product sold by plaintiff is ‘entertainment’ in one form or another, then not only the advertising of the product but also an ingredient of the product itself can amount to a trademark protectable under § 43(a) because the ingredient can come to symbolize the plaintiff or its product in the public mind.”).
76. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
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years. 77 Thus, it is essentially impossible to destroy opportunities for a
character to achieve trademark status.78 After that, the trademark owner
has wide powers, through dilution principles, to prevent others from displaying the character in almost any other context.79
The Ninth Circuit understandably felt uncomfortable with the notion
that trademarks could allow Fleischer to control Betty Boop’s image when
copyrights are not up to the task. 80 In this regard, the court accurately recognized that care must be taken to ensure that trademarks do not interfere with
the public policy balance underlying the copyright system. 81 However, when
the court addressed the issue, it reached a confusing and potentially overextensive conclusion that would jeopardize the longevity of practically all
artistic trademarks. This article, therefore, proposes a coherent and workable
approach that distinguishes the trademark treatment of media characters such
as Betty Boop from other artistic identifiers, such as the Nike Swoosh.
III. OOPS!: BETTY BOOP AND THE ISSUE OF AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
A. The Rationales for Intellectual Property Protection
The United States economic system is based on the fundamental notion that public welfare is best advanced by free competition.82 Allowing
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (stating that in business contexts that often involve works made
for hire, copyright protection lasts for 95 years); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–122 (2006) (outlining
several exceptions to copyright privileges).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
79. See id. § 1125(c). Owners of famous trademarks have rights under federal law to prevent dilution of their marks due to blurring and tarnishment. See id. This protection gives owners of famous trademarks far more extensive rights than traditionally enjoyed under likelihood of
confusion principles, allowing them to prevent application of similar marks on almost any product or service offered in the market. Trademark infringement requires that the defendant sell
goods that are either competitive or related to the plaintiff’s goods. See AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft
Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348 (9th Cir. 1979). With dilution, the plaintiff has rights against any substantially similar use that impairs the distinctiveness of its mark, regardless of competition or
likelihood of confusion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). Owners of famous marks also may have dilution rights under several state unfair competition laws. See, e.g., Michael Travis, In Search of a
Consistent Trademark Dilution Test, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1449, 1453–58 (1990); Robert Brauneis
& Paul Heald, Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, and the Decline in Sharing of Famous Brand Names: An Introduction and Empirical Study, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 149–50 (2011)
(discussing various state trademark dilution statutes).
80. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 636 F.3d at 1124, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d
958 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If we ruled that A.V.E.L.A.’s depictions of Betty Boop infringed
Fleischer’s trademarks, the Betty Boop character would essentially never enter the public domain.
Such a result would run directly contrary to Dastar . . . .”).
81. See id.
82. See E. Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 958 (2d Cir. 1943)
(“[T]here is a basic public policy, deep-rooted in our economy and respected by the courts, rest-
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competitors to freely copy products and services leads to lower costs, better
features, and reduced prices. 83 However, inventors and artists may be reluctant to invest in creative activities if they know that others can freely utilize them as soon as they are disclosed to the public.84 Thus, they may decide to forego development of the ideas, or if possible, distribute them
through secret channels. 85 In either event, social welfare is diminished because members of the public do not get to widely benefit from creations
that they otherwise might have enjoyed. 86
The patent and copyright systems are intended to solve this problem by
granting inventors and artists a limited period of exclusivity so that they
have an opportunity to profit from their creativity before facing free competition. 87 Both regimes are theoretically characterized by a finely tuned balance that provides just the right length and degree of protection to sufficiently reward innovators before competitors in the marketplace gain full access
to their creative works. 88 The patent system, for instance, provides developers of useful products and processes the exclusive right to make, use, and
sell their inventions for twenty years. 89 To earn this protection, the inventions have to meet several specified standards, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 90 Those useful inventions that fail to meet these requirements
are not deemed worthy of a patent, and so should remain free for the public

ing on the assumption that social welfare is best advanced by free competition . . . .”); see also
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (stating that imitation
and refinement through imitation are the very lifeblood of a competitive economy).
83. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 583.
84. See generally Paul Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to Lear, 59
CAL. L. REV. 873, 878 (1971) (arguing that the purpose of copyright, patent, and trademark law is
to ensure protection of incentivizing participation in the creation of ideas).
85. See id. at 878 (stating that although short range competitive interests would benefit
from immediate and free public access to technological and artistic innovation, such access would
destroy incentive to innovate).
86. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 583 (“[S]ocial net welfare will be maximized if disclosed ideas are freely accessible to all.”).
87. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (allowing exclusive rights for limited times to authors
and inventors); see also Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146 (“From their inception, the federal patent
laws have embodied a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the
very lifeblood of a competitive economy.”).
88. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003)
(“The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain,’ under
which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution.”) (internal citations omitted)).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006) (providing a twenty-year term from the effective filing date).
90. See id. §§ 102–103 (2006).
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to copy. 91 The same goes when inventors opt not to protect their useful inventions by patents. 92 Again, the public must be free to copy those inventions, or the balance of the patent system will be unduly displaced. 93 Likewise, and perhaps most obviously, the public must gain full rights to the
invention after the patent expires. 94 Thus, any legislative attempts by state
governments to protect unpatented or un-patentable inventions typically will
be preempted because they will interfere with the policy objectives of the
federal patent laws. 95 Also, Congress must take great care when devising its
laws to ensure that they do not upset the delicate balance crafted for patents,
and the courts must assume that federal laws are not intended to interfere
with that balance unless Congress specifically states otherwise. 96
The same considerations are true for design patents and copyrights. 97
The former provides fourteen years of protection to novel and non-obvious
product designs. 98 Copyrights grant a relatively long period of protection
for original material in expressive works such as books, movies, paintings,
and sculpture. 99 Thus, a copyright provides the creators of a movie, like
Finding Nemo, the power to prevent others from making a movie that is
substantially similar to the original for the duration of the copyright peri91. See Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 (“The novelty and nonobviousness requirements of
patentability embody a congressional understanding, implicit in the Patent Clause itself, that free
exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent is the exception.”).
92. See id. at 149 (“Once an inventor has decided to lift the veil of secrecy from his work, he
must choose the protection of a federal patent or the dedication of his idea to the public at large.”).
93. See id. at 152 (noting that Congress strikes a balance in patent laws between the desire
to exploit freely the “full potential of our inventive resources” and the need to incentivize the use
of these resources).
94. See id. (“We have long held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject
matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.”).
95. See, e.g., id. at 152; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964).
96. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995) (stating
that federal trademark law must be interpreted to prevent interference with the patent law’s objectives of encouraging innovation); Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 168 (“It is for Congress to determine
if the present system of design and utility patents is ineffectual in promoting the useful arts in the
context of industrial design.”); see also Digital Millennium Protection Act of 1998, Title V, Pub.
L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (enacting a federal equivalent of the law struck down in
Bonito Boats).
97. See e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 U.S. at 230–31 (providing that federal design patent standards are “carefully used to promote invention while at the same time preserving free
competition.”); see also Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33–34 (noting that copyrights are part of a
carefully crafted bargain which can only be altered with specificity by Congress).
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2006).
99. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (stating that copyright subsists “in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression” including literary works, musical works,
motion pictures, and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works, among others).
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od. 100 In addition, courts have determined that certain well-developed
characters, such as Nemo, are sufficiently creative that they can have copyright protection independently from the works in which they appear.101
Thus, any other company that displays an image substantially similar to the
character, Nemo, would violate the copyright, unless its use falls under a
special exception such as fair use.102
While patents and copyrights provide exclusive rights so that creative
individuals might earn suitable profits from their innovations, trademarks
are intended to serve an altogether different role. 103 In an unrestrained
marketplace, competitors would be free to duplicate every observable attribute of a product, 104 which could make it very difficult for consumers to
locate products from a particular source that they desire. The primary goal
of the trademark system is to address this problem by giving companies exclusive rights to identification symbols so that consumers can distinguish
their products from those made by competitors. 105 Thus, trademarks are
intended to reduce the likelihood that consumers might be confused about
the sources of competitive products that otherwise might look identical.106

100. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 966–67 (8th Cir.
2005) (explaining that one infringes the reproduction right not just by making an exact duplication, but also by making a work that is substantially similar to the copyrighted expression).
101. See, e.g., Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 654 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“There is no doubt that a separate Betty Boop character copyright exists.”). See generally Rice v.
Fox Broad. Co., 330 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating that characters that are “especially
distinctive” receive copyright protection apart from the copyrighted work) (emphasis added).
102. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The Copyright Act provides that it is not an infringement to make a fair use of a work “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship or research . . . .” The Act
provides four factors that are relevant to determine whether a use of copyrighted work is a fair
use: “(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use if of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”
103. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of exclusivity.”).
104. See Lee B. Burgunder, Product Design Protection After Bonito Boats: Where it Belongs and How It Should Get There, 28 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (1990).
105. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2006); see also Burgunder, supra note 104, at 7–10.
106. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1) (2006) (providing that trademark infringement
results when a company uses a trademark in a way that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
deception). See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265, 270 (1987) (noting in a freely competitive marketplace,
competitors would routinely copy identifying marks because the cost of copying those characteristics would typically be less than the value of the goodwill that could be appropriated through
consumer confusion).
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The protection of trademarks leads to several beneficial social effects. 107 First and foremost, trademarks prevent unscrupulous competitors
from trying to fool unsuspecting consumers into buying their inferior products by mistake. 108 Thus, trademarks preserve standards of commercial
ethics. 109 Also, trademarks make it easy for consumers to locate the goods
and services that they want, thus reducing the amount of time and resources
they otherwise might have to invest to complete a successful search.110 In
this way, trademarks enhance market efficiency. 111 In addition, companies
are more likely to invest in quality when competitors cannot easily siphon
off and confuse customers with inferior products or services.112
In a perfect world, the trademark system provides these benefits without
any countervailing social harms. As a starting matter, trademarks in their purest forms are simply identification symbols that are included with goods or
services to designate source. 113 In this sense, the trademark system prevents
competitors from copying the protected identification symbol, but allows
them to freely duplicate the underlying products that the consumers primarily
want.114 Thus, trademarks achieve their purposes without overstepping into
the functions that patents and copyrights are designed to perform. 115

107. See e.g., Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 34 (“Federal trademark law . . . ‘reduces the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ and ‘helps assure a producer that it
(and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards associated
with a desirable product.’”) (quoting Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163–64).
108. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 587; Gary Spratling, The Protectability of Package,
Container and Product Configurations (Part I), 5 U.S.F. L. REV. 451, 465–66 (1971); Brown
Chemical Co. v. Meyer, 139 U.S. 540, 544 (1891).
109. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 587; Spratling, supra note 108, at 465–66; Brown
Chemical Co., 139 U.S. at 544.
110. See generally Ralph Folsom & Larry Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89 YALE
L. J. 1323, 1336 (1980).
111. See id. at 1336.
112. See S. REP. NO. 1333 (1945), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N 1274, 1275 (“Trademarks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good
reputation which excellence creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is . . . to secure to the
business community the advantages of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion
from those who have created them to those who have not.”).
113. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (stating that the Lanham Act allows registration of “any
word, name, symbol, or device” that is capable of identifying and distinguishing goods or services).
114. The trademark system now allows product attributes to potentially serve as trademarks, making it more difficult to distinguish the identifier from the underlying product. Still, the
identifier must at least be conceptually separable from the notion of the basic or generic product.
See e.g., Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431, 1449–50 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“[T]he configuration for which protection is sought must not appear to the consumer as a mere
component, or the essence, of the product gestalt, but rather must appear as something attached
(in a conceptual sense) to function in actuality as a source designator—it must appear to the con-
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Trademarks also typically improve efficiency without raising competitive roadblocks. 116 It is hard to imagine how exclusive rights to a word,
such as EXXON, might hurt competing oil companies since they can
choose from literally millions of other names to identify their products. 117
However, not all selections may be so benign, and when that happens,
trademark rights have to be handled more cautiously. 118 For instance,
providing trademark rights to the generic name of a product, such as
“BASEBALL,” would clearly provide market advantages because competitors might have a hard time assuring consumers that their products suitably
achieve the same functions. 119 Thus, trademarks are never appropriate for
words that are, or become, generic.120
Likewise, potential competitive concerns arise when companies select
descriptive words and phrases, such as “ROLLERBLADE,” to serve as
trademarks. In one sense, these choices do not even act as trademarks by
designating source because consumers usually perceive them at first as
merely describing the product. Also, if there are only a few other equally
good ways to describe the product, then providing trademark protection
might be advantageous to the lucky registrants of these effective names

sumer to act as an independent signifier of origin rather than as a component of the good.”) (emphasis added); see also Burgunder, supra note 70, at 282–85.
115. See Duraco Prods., Inc., 40 F.3d at 1449–50 (“[T]he configuration for which protection is sought must not appear to the consumer as a mere component, or the essence, of the product gestalt, but rather must appear as something attached (in a conceptual sense) to function in
actuality as a source designator—it must appear to the consumer to act as an independent signifier
of origin rather than as a component of the good.”) (emphasis added); see also Burgunder, supra
note 70, at 282–85.
116. See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark Protection of Live Animals: The Bleat Goes On,
10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 715, 720 (2011); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918) (“In truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in a
proper sense, but is merely a convenient means for facilitating the protection of one’s good-will
in trade . . . .”).
117. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976);
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 106, at 290.
118. See infra Part III.A.
119. See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark and Copyright: How Intimate Should the Close
Relationship Become?, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 89, 97 (1989); Landes & Posner, supra note
106, at 291–96.
120. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9 (providing that the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1127, 1064(B) (2006), only allows registration of marks that are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of the applicant, and allows cancellation of marks that become common
descriptive names). Although registration for generic words is not permitted, trademarks are allowed for phrases that include generic words, as long as the entire phrase is distinctive. See generally COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0022406 (reciting a soda with the generic word “cola”
included in the mark).
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since all the other choices are inferior shorthand tools for marketing. 121 For
both of these reasons, the trademark system does not provide protection to
words that primarily have descriptive meanings. 122 However, when a company uses a descriptive term exclusively for a long period of time and
makes efforts to have consumers associate the phrase with an individual
source, then consumers might be confused if other companies were then
permitted to use it. 123 Under these circumstances, the term is said to have
“secondary meaning,” 124 which refers to the source identification properties
that became subsequently associated with it.125 In this instance, protection
may be allowed if the potential for consumer confusion outweighs concerns
about the competitors’ access to equally informative names. 126
B. The Increasing Problems with Overlapping IP Protection Systems
As described, patents and copyrights have been devised to provide incentives toward different forms of creative innovations, while trademarks
serve different purposes. 127 Patents are intended to protect useful machines
and processes, as well as the designs of useful products, while copyrights
cover expressions, but not ideas, processes, or systems of operation. 128
Trademarks, on the other hand, are simply identification symbols that companies include with products to help consumers find their products by reducing potential confusion with competitive offerings. 129 Over time,
though, courts and Congress have expanded the range of protections offered by each of the systems, 130 leading to overlapping coverage that challenges the fundamental balances that respectfully underlie them. 131

121. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 599; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 106,
at 290.
122. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e) (2006).
123. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 599.
124. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 211 (2000).
125. See id. at 210.
126. See Lee B. Burgunder, Trademark Protection of Smells: Sense or Nonsense, 29 AM.
BUS. L. J. 459, 472 (1991); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 106, at 290.
127. See supra Part II.
128. See supra Part III.A.
129. See id.
130. See id. Courts have also expanded patent rights to cover new realms, such as computer programs, business methods, and possibly human genes. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130
S.Ct. 3218 (2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent
& Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2356.
131. See infra Part III.A.
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For instance, due to both new laws and court interpretations, copyrights now may protect computer programs 132 and the architecture of buildings, 133 despite their clearly useful purposes. The expansion with trademarks is even more profound. Trademarks are no longer confined to
separate identification symbols; now the actual components of products,
such as their color, 134 smell, 135 sound, 136 or overall design, 137 may qualify. 138 These trends cause obvious tensions with the patent and copyright
systems, which have very limited and circumscribed standards for protection to maintain the appropriate social balance. 139 In addition, trademarks
no longer simply address the likelihood of confusion with competitive
products. 140 Rather, companies owning certain trademarks have rights
against non-competing uses through the doctrine of dilution, and against
applications that may cause confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation.141
Both of these movements increasingly allow companies to own more than a
simple means to reduce source confusion; instead they can exercise almost
complete control over any use of an identification device. 142

132. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Courts have interpreted the Copyright Act to protect computer programs because the Act provides a definition of the phrase, “computer programs.” See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246–48
(3d Cir. 1983); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); see also 17
U.S.C. § 117 (providing limitations to the extent of protection for computer programs); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int’l., 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (D.C. Mass. 1990) (“Although Congress did not include ‘computer programs’ in this list of examples of ‘works of authorship,’ computer programs fall squarely within the statutory definition of literary works.”).
133. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8) (listing architectural works as within the scope of
copyright protection); see also Diehr, 450 U.S. 175; State St. Bank & Trust Co., 149 F.3d 1368;
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d 1329, vacated, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 2356.
134. E.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164–65 (stating that the green-gold color of dry cleaning press pad qualifies for trademark registration).
135. E.g., In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238 (T.T.A.B. 1990) (considering whether the
smell of plumeria blossoms for yarn qualified for trademark registration).
136. See, e.g., Registration No. 0916522 (reciting the trademark of a sequence of chimelike musical notes).
137. See, e.g., Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 211 (establishing that product designs may be protected as trademarks with proof of secondary meaning).
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
139. See Richard H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 135–40 (1999).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2006).
141. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a)(1), 1125(c).
142. See Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1473, 1495 (2004)
(providing that some scholars refer to this trend as a “propertization of trademarks”).
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The increasing overlap of potential protection from these disparate systems leads to significant questions about the unintended impacts that each
might have on the policy objectives of the others and requires policy makers
to fashion appropriate limits to preserve social welfare. 143 As just one example, consider the body design of the Mazda3 automobile. It is possible to
argue that the design could be subject to a utility patent due to airflow characteristics, a design patent for its ornamental appearance, a copyright for its
sculptural beauty, and a trademark for its distinctive look. How should the
courts parcel out which forms of protection are appropriate, when each is
applicable, and to what degree? Cartoon and other media characters, such
as Betty Boop, may pose challenges as well. 144 Since product attributes
may now serve as trademarks, one can argue that distinctive characters can
represent the source of the films or books in which they appear. 145 Coupled
with dilution and sponsorship rights, the trademark owner perhaps could
control all uses of the character in any commercial context, even after copyright privileges are lost or expire. 146 How should courts address this obvious conflict with the policy goals of copyright?
1. The Copyright-Patent Overlap
Although applications of Betty Boop’s image will almost never raise
patent issues, the tests that courts have devised to address potentially overlapping copyright and patent protections are instructive in the more pertinent context involving trademarks and copyrights.147 The essential questions are what will happen when works of art are turned into useful
articles? or alternatively when are useful articles so creatively expressive or
beautiful that they also qualify as works of art? 148 Patent protection lasts

143. See id. at 1474, 1531 n.274.
144. See, e.g., Laurie Richter, Reproductive Freedom: Striking a Fair Balance Between
Copyright and Other Intellectual Property Protections in Cartoon Characters, 21 ST. THOMAS L.
REV. 441 (2009); Helfand, supra note 73, at 623.
145. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P., v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1396
(9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the Cat in the Hat character is a common law trademark representing
the source of the Cat in the Hat stories); Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d
789, 804 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Barney character serves as a trademark representing the
source of the “Barney and Friends “television show); DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assocs., 486 F.
Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (stating that the physical appearances of the Aquaman and Plastic Man characters may serve as trademarks for the entertainment media in which they appear).
146. See Moffat, supra note 142, at 1513–21.
147. Betty Boop might conceivably raise design patent issues if her image were used as a
sculptural component of a useful item, such as a toy robot. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
215–19 (1954) (allowing copyright registration for statuettes that served as table lamp bases).
148. See generally Burgunder, supra note 104, at 7–10.
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for fourteen to twenty years, 149 depending on the circumstances, but if
copyright protection were available, the owner could extend protection
over the design for far longer. 150
One way that the Copyright Act attempts to deal with the potential
overlap is with the following provision:
[T]he design of a useful article . . . shall be considered a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that,
such design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article.151
Courts have struggled with the application of this language in cases dealing
with lamp bases and fixtures, 152 belt buckles, 153 mannequins, 154 and bike
racks, 155 among other topics. The easiest way to handle the situation would
be to permit copyright protection for the artistic elements only when they
can be physically removed from the product without affecting its ability to
function. 156 In a sense, this would effectively bar the overlap since the
copyright only applies to elements that have no function.157 However,
courts have not been willing to take such an extreme position, 158 and instead entertain the notion of conceptually separating the artistic elements
from the useful functions. 159
The difficulty, then, has been devising tests that inform when appropriate conceptual separation exists. To this end, courts have considered several tests, including: (1) whether the primary use of the article is as an artistic work; (2) whether the artistic aspects are primary; (3) whether the article
is marketable as art; and (4) whether the article was first developed as art

149. Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/inventors/
patents.jsp (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006) (providing that for works made for hire and anonymous
works, copyright protection lasts ninety-five years from the date of first publication (or 120 years
from the year of creation), and that copyrights in other works last for the life of the author plus
seventy years).
151. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
152. See Mazer, 347 U.S. 201; Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
153. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
154. See Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
155. See Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
156. See Darren Hudson Hick, Conceptual Problems of Conceptual Separability and the
Non-Usefulness of the Useful Articles Distinction, 57 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 37, 49–51 (2010).
157. See id. at 39–40.
158. Id.
159. See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
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uninhibited by functional considerations. 160 Although all of these tests are
slightly different, two overriding considerations do stand out.161 One relates
to the importance of the artistic elements. 162 The more that the artistry can
somehow be viewed as “primary,” the more that dual coverage seems to be
appropriate. 163 The other involves the creator’s intent whether the purpose
was to create a work of art as opposed to an industrial design.164 Putting
these together, one might ask whether the developer’s primary purpose in
creating the piece was to make an aesthetic work of art, which would point
toward dual protection, or whether the primary goal was to make a useful
article, which would serve to exclude copyright protection.
The Copyright Act also attempts to avoid dual coverage with patents
through its definition of copyrightable subject matter. 165 The statute provides that copyrights are available to protect original expressions in works
of authorship, but the rights cannot extend to ideas, processes, systems, or
methods of operation. 166 In this regard, the most difficult issues have arisen in the context of computer programs and user interfaces since they rely
on written instructions and displays to make the computers work and help
customers operate them. 167
Although computer programs are clearly patentable as useful process168
es, the courts, at first, gave copyrights a significant role in their protection as well, thus making the degree of overlapping coverage somewhat
great. 169 For instance, copyrights protected not only the lines of code selected to instruct the machine, but also the structure, sequence, and organi-

160. Carol Barnhart, Inc., 773 F.2d at 421–22 (Newman, J., dissenting); Brandir Int’l,
Inc., 834 F.2d at 1144.
161. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203–05; see also Carol Barnhart, Inc., 773 F.2d at 415–18.
162. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 203–05.
163. See id.
164. See Carol Barnhart, Inc., 773 F.2d at 415–18.
165. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir.
1993); Atari Games v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Computer Assocs., Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d 1240; Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d 807;
Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. 37.
168. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Federal Circuit stated,
“a computer operating pursuant to software may represent patentable subject matter.” Id. The
major debate with computer programs is the degree to which physical processes must be included
with the claims. See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 3218.
169. See Moffat, supra note 142, at 1501.
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zation of the program. 170 Likewise, with user interfaces, copyrights protected almost anything that appeared on the screen, including the choice
and arrangement of command terms. 171 In both instances, the courts allowed coverage because other developers had several alternative options to
achieve the program’s overall goals. 172 Thus, the concept of the idea or
system was seen in very abstract terms, thereby opening the door to significant copyright coverage. 173
More recently, though, courts have significantly reduced the role of
copyrights by taking a more practical approach to the utilitarian characteristics of computer programs and interfaces. 174 With computer programs,
courts now focus on each characteristic and feature to determine the importance of its individual role to the overall utility, efficiency, and industry
acceptance of the product.175 These attributes, which are viewed as primarily suited to patents, are filtered from the realm of copyright, so that all that
remains is a small nugget or core of protectable expression. 176 In fact, in the
leading computer program case, Computer Associates International, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., the court believed that the copyright system is not ideally suited
for protecting computer technology at all, but that Congress required copyrights to have a role.177 Nonetheless, the court refused to impair the overall
integrity of copyright law. 178 The same trend also emerged with user interfaces, so that courts now tend to view the entire menu system as a method of
operation solely within the purview of patents. 179 Here, too, courts have
sought to remove much of the overlapping protection and more clearly delineate the separate and independent roles of patents and copyrights. 180
2. The Trademark-Patent Overlap and the Functionality Doctrine
As previously noted, the courts over time have expanded the forms of
identification devices that may serve as trademarks, 181 so that distinctive
170. See Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d at 1248.
171. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 68.
172. See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1240; see also Lotus Dev. 740 F. Supp. at 67–68.
173. See Lee B. Burgunder & Carey E. Heckman, An Emerging Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 HIGH TECH. L. J. 229, 240–42 (1987).
174. See Computer Assocs., Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d 693.
175. See id. at 701–12.
176. See id. at 710.
177. Id. at 712.
178. Id.
179. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 815–18.
180. Id. at 816–19.
181. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. 205.
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product designs and features now may qualify. 182 Since product attributes
have become subject to trademarks, overlap with the patent system necessarily results because patents protect both utilitarian features and ornamental product designs. 183 As always, the overlap leads to potential conflicts
between the policy goals of each, but in this regard, the patent system must
always take precedence since it was specifically devised to protect these
kinds of innovations. 184
Recent Supreme Court decisions bear this out, since they have called
for greater caution before extending trademark rights to product designs.185
For instance, one might ask if a highly unusual product design could be so
immediately distinctive that it would automatically serve as a trademark,
not unlike the word “EXXON.” The Supreme Court ruled that product designs, no matter how distinctive, should always be treated like descriptive
marks, since consumers typically view them, at first, as simply an attractive
aspect of the product rather than as an identifier.186 Thus, the Court required that secondary meaning be proven under every circumstance.187 In
this regard, the Supreme Court recognized that this additional hurdle might
sometimes increase instances of consumer confusion.188 However, in doing
so, the Court also determined that “[c]onsumers should not be deprived of
the benefits of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves.” 189 In other words, when the
goal of preventing confusion might interfere with rights to fairly compete,
then competition must prevail.

182. See generally id. at 216 (holding distinct product designs are protected under the
Lanham Act).
183. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 171 (2006).
184. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29; Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164.
185. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 214–15; see also TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S.
at 29.
186. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 213. Prior to this decision, some lower courts, including the Second Circuit in the Samara litigation, determined that product designs might be
inherently distinctive and could be protected by the trademark laws without proof of secondary
meaning. See, e.g., Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 124–25 (2d Cir.
1998) (determining that product designs might be inherently distinctive and could therefore be
protected by the trademark laws without proof of secondary meaning).
187. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 215.
188. See id. at 214 (“[G]iven the unlikelihood of inherently source-identifying design, the
game of allowing suit . . . [is] not worth the candle.”).
189. Id. at 213.
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a. Utilitarian and aesthetic functionality
More pertinent to the Betty Boop litigation is the application of what
is called the “functionality doctrine,” since the Ninth Circuit, on its first
pass, relied on this doctrine to sanction Art & Vintage Entertainment Licensing Agency, Inc.’s (“A.V.E.L.A.”) use of the character.190 The functionality doctrine was specifically developed to prevent the trademark system from protecting product designs when such protection would upset the
carefully crafted objectives of the patent regime. 191 In this regard, the
courts are concerned with two associated but slightly different issues. The
first relates to the notion that useful inventions and product designs are
supposed to be subject to free competition, unless they are covered by patents. 192 Thus, tensions inevitably arise whenever trademarks are used to
protect unpatented useful articles.193 The other issue relates to the overarching goal of patents, which is to stimulate creativity via the profits inventors might earn from exercising control over what they hope are superior product attributes. 194 For this reason, trademark protection of product
designs is troublesome when exclusivity offers competitive advantages.
According to the Supreme Court, a product feature is functional and
cannot serve as a trademark “if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”195 This is true, according to the Court, even if the attribute has acquired secondary meaning. 196
Thus, the doctrine is an absolute bar, and trumps potential confusion. 197
190. See generally Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d 958.
191. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29; Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164–65;
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985).
192. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29 (“In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be subject to copying.”);
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164–65 (“If a product’s functional features could be used as trademarks,
however, a monopoly over such features could be obtained without regard to whether they qualify
as patents and could be extended forever.”).
193. See e.g., Burgunder, supra note 119, at 725.
194. See Burgunder, supra note 70, at 593 (“Only the patent and copyright laws are designed to allow a producer to achieve supranormal profits.”).
195. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982).
196. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (stating that the functionality doctrine “therefore would
require, to take an imaginary example, that even if customers have come to identify the special
illumination-enhancing shape of a new patented light bulb with a particular manufacturer, the
manufacturer may not use that shape as a trademark . . . .”).
197. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 34–35 (stating that the Lanham Act “does
not protect trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer or seller”); W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 338 (“[T]he concept of functionality is intended to screen out
from the protection of trademark law certain design features even if they have become so far
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Until recently, there had been substantial debate about the application
of the functionality doctrine to designs that contribute to the product’s utility. 198 Many courts determined that a feature was not “essential to the use
or purpose of the article” if competitors might be able to configure the
product in alternative ways to achieve the same function. 199 Thus, the focus was on whether trademark protection would result in competitive advantages. 200 In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that this was an incorrect approach. 201 Instead, courts
must prevent trademark protection whenever the feature contributes to the
operation of the article in more than an incidental fashion.202 This is true
even when there might be other ways to achieve the same function.203 Consequently, the Supreme Court criticized the lower courts for allowing
trademarks to overreach into the province of patents.204
Often, companies want to use trademarks to protect product designs
that are attractive but have little relation to the product’s utility. 205 Although the Supreme Court has taken a rather absolute stand regarding useful
features, its approach to aesthetic designs is a little more permissive. 206
identified with the manufacturer of a particular brand that consumers may be confused about the
origin of the good if another producer is allowed to adopt the feature.”).
198. See, e.g., Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 940 (6th Cir.
1999), rev’d sub nom. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (concluding that a dual-spring design for a sign-holding mechanism was not functional because it did
not take much imagination to conceive of other ways to achieve the function without using the
trade dress); In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Co., 671 F.2d 1332, 1342 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Kohler Co.
v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 643 (7th Cir. 1993); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. W. Bend Co., 123 F.3d
246, 257 (5th Cir. 1997).
199. See, e.g., Mktg. Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 939–40; In re Morton-Norwich Prods.
Co., 671 F.2d at 1342; Kohler Co., 12 F.3d at 643; Sunbeam Prods., Inc.,123 F.3d at 257.
200. See e.g., Mktg. Displays, Inc., 200 F.3d at 940; Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that in evaluating utilitarian fan
grill designs, functionality is defined “in terms of competitive need”).
201. See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. 23.
202. See id. at 32–34.
203. See id. at 33 (“There is no need, furthermore, to engage, as did the Court of Appeals,
in speculation about other design possibilities . . . .”).
204. See id. at 34 (“The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their
innovation in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of the patent law and its period of
exclusivity.”).
205. See Burgunder, supra note 116, at 727–29.
206. The U.S. Constitution provides some explanation for this because it empowers the
federal government to provide exclusive rights to inventors and writers for only limited periods of
time. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have the Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”). Since trademarks may potentially last forever, significant constitutional questions arise whenever they might protect items
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Thus, the Court has concluded that aesthetic product designs are functional
only when exclusive rights would give the trademark owner a competitive
advantage in the market.207 Such an advantage may arise if consumers
consider the aesthetic attribute to be an important reason to purchase the
product. 208 Companies also may gain an advantage if the feature is more
attractive or desirable than other potential options that competitors might
use with their products. 209 Based on these considerations, Owens-Corning
was able to register the color pink as a trademark for home insulation because (1) color is not an important factor in a consumer’s decision to purchase insulation, and (2) other companies had numerous other color options
that they might use on their insulation.210 On the other hand, an Italian
shoe company has recently faced questions about whether a red sole may
serve as a trademark because consumers may consider color to be an important factor in a fashion purchase decision. 211
that fundamentally are useful inventions or expressive materials. See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532
U.S. at 35 (stating that we do not need to resolve the question whether “the Patent Clause of the
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8, of its own force, prohibits the holder of an expired utility patent
from claiming trade dress protection”). Strictly speaking, aesthetic product designs are outside of
the Constitutional mandate, which only specifically applies to “the useful Arts,” so Congress may
have more flexibility to regulate them. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Also, some courts claim that
the market could be a dull and unimaginative place if designers had to rely solely on the design
patent system to protect aesthetic innovation. See LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71,
77 (2d Cir. 1985); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that states may use unfair competition laws to protect aesthetic
trade dress, even though the designs may be proper subjects for design patent protection. Bonito
Boats, 489 U.S. at 154.
207. See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33 (“It is proper to inquire into a ‘significant
non-reputation related disadvantage’ in cases of aesthetic functionality.”).
208. See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165; Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d
339, 344 (9th Cir. 1952) (holding that floral design of china pattern was aesthetically functional
because it was an important ingredient in commercial success); Industria Arredementi Fratellin
Saporti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the design of an Italian sofa was aesthetically functional because it was a principle characteristic of the sofa that enhanced its salability).
209. See, e.g., W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 342–43 (holding that a hexagonal end-panel
of a stacking tray is not aesthetically functional if effective competition is possible without it,
such as by using other shapes that are equally appealing); Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165 (evaluating the aesthetic functionality of color in terms of whether it makes a product more desirable).
210. See In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(“[D]epriving the public of the right to color fibrous residential insulation ‘pink’ (1) does not hinder competition and (2) does not take from the goods . . . something of substantial value.”) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted).
211. Although Christian Louboutin has a trademark registration for the red soles on shoes,
a federal district court denied a motion for summary judgment against Yves Saint Laurent’s sale
of red-soled shoes “[b]ecause in the fashion industry color serves ornamental and aesthetic functions vital to robust competition . . . .” See Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.,
Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 449 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Also, in the context of fashion, color “performs
a creative function” because “[i]t is a feature purposely given to an article of art or design to de-
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It is important to reemphasize that the objective of aesthetic functionality is to ensure that companies do not unfairly benefit by obtaining exclusive rights to attractive product features through trademarks. For this reason, the focus of the analysis is on the inherent or comparative value of the
feature itself before trademark rights are even obtained. Thus, pink could
be registered as a trademark because it provided no competitive advantages
in selling insulation. 212 However, there is no question that Owens-Corning
has invested heavily in the quality of its products and advertising so that
many customers actually prefer pink insulation.213 This preference, though,
results from the reputation that Owens-Corning has built around the color exactly what a trademark is supposed to encourage. 214 Therefore, it
would be wrong for competitors to rely on functionality to argue that they
now should be able to use the color pink on their products based on competitive need. As the Supreme Court has made clear several times, functionality is about “non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 215
Another relevant fact is that several courts once questioned the
breadth of the aesthetic functionality doctrine or whether it should exist at
all. 216 By so doing, they expanded the potential overlap between trademarks and design patents. 217 The Supreme Court, though, has more recently stepped into the fray and confirmed that aesthetic functionality must be
fully addressed. 218 This, once again, demonstrates the Court’s determinapict the idea as the creator conceived it . . . .” Id. at 452. This decision was appealed to a panel of
the Second Circuit, which had ruled, at the time this Comment went to press, that the Loubouton
red sole is in fact entitled to limited trademark protection. Don Jeffrey & Cotton Timberlake,
Louboutin Wins Appeal Over Saint Lauren Red Sole Shoes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept.
5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-05/louboutin-wins-appeal-over-saint-laurentred-soles-shoes.html.
212. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d at 1121.
213. Id. at 1125.
214. See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“[A]esthetic functionality has been limited to product features that serve an aesthetic
purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function.”).
215. Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 165; TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
216. See, e.g., Robert Unikel, Better By Design: The Availability of Trade Dress Protection for Product Design and the Demise of “Aesthetic Functionality”, 85 TRADEMARK REP. 312
(1995); Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001); Pebble
Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 540 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998).
217. By not considering aesthetic functionality, courts limited the arguments one could
make to defeat trademark rights in aesthetic features. See, e.g., Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that
the configuration of a snowball machine was aesthetically functional because it contributed to the
commercial success of the product). This in turn increases the chances for possible dual coverage
with design patents, which also protects aesthetic product attributes.
218. See TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 33.
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tion to more clearly demarcate the independent and exclusive roles of the
separate intellectual property regimes.
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Dangerous Misapplication of Aesthetic
Functionality
The Ninth Circuit panel clearly believed that Fleischer should not
have been able to use trademark law to prevent A.V.E.L.A. from displaying
Betty Boop’s image on t-shirts and other merchandise, but had difficulty
devising the legal theory to substantiate its intuition.219 The panel is certainly not alone in disapproving of the wide powers that trademark owners
now wield to prevent almost anyone from displaying their trademarks on
commercial products without permission through a license.220 Nonetheless,
its original reliance on the aesthetic functionality doctrine to address its
concerns was definitely the wrong approach.
The Ninth Circuit panel, in its first opinion, claimed that Fleischer’s
trademark rights in Betty Boop did not extend to A.V.E.L.A.’s use on merchandise because her image was a functional aesthetic component of the
products. 221 Drawing on the “important factor” test, it reached this conclusion because the image was the actual benefit that the consumer wished to
purchase. 222 This conclusion, of course may be correct; many people do
buy these shirts to demonstrate their affection for the character.223 But individuals also buy merchandise bearing more traditional trademarks, such
as “NIKE,” “BOSTON CELTICS,” or “UCLA” for the very same reason.
Thus, the notion that aesthetic functionality applies to the prominent display of trademarks on merchandise would jeopardize a wide range of existing practices.224
Aesthetic functionality, though, is not about the use of an established
trademark. 225 Rather, the proper application should be confined to the ini219. See Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124–25 (9th Cir.
2011), withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
220. See Irene Calboli, The Case for a Limited Protection of Trademark Merchandising,
11 U. ILL. L. REV. 865, 888–91 (2011).
221. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 636 F.3d at 1124.
222. See id. at 1123 (quoting Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d
912, 917 (9th Cir. 1980)).
223. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 961 (noting that Betty Boop merchandise has
reached a very high level of popularity).
224. In reaching the conclusion that the use of Betty Boop’s image was functional, the
court recognized that the image was a prominent feature of each item so as to be visible to others
when worn. See id. at 1124.
225. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995).
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tial acquisition of trademark rights. Thus, one might use aesthetic functionality to question whether Fleischer can acquire trademark rights in Betty Boop, but once that hurdle is passed, the doctrine is no longer relevant.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit had already dispensed with this issue five
years earlier in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 226
which involved unapproved uses of AUDI and VOLKSWAGEN trademarks on keychains and license plate covers. The court, in that instance,
appropriately determined that aesthetic functionality did not apply, despite
the fact that consumers purchased the products primarily because they
wanted the marks that were displayed on the merchandise. 227 In this instance, the court correctly followed the Supreme Court’s directive and determined that “aesthetic functionality has been limited to product features
that serve an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any sourceidentifying function.” 228
What is perhaps more intriguing is that the defendant selling the automobile merchandise in Au-Tomotive Gold could have made the colorable
claim that consumers were not so much interested in the reputation behind
the marks, but rather wanted their license plates and keychains to match
their existing cars.229 This might put the unlicensed distributor at a “significant non-reputation-related” 230 disadvantage because the company needs
the trademarks to satisfy the consumers’ desire for décor compatibility.231
Although courts have refuted the relevance of décor compatibility to functionality, the decision in Au-Tomotive Gold nevertheless should have been
a closer call than the one involving Betty Boop. 232 Thus, it is odd that the
court even momentarily resurrected aesthetic functionality to address
A.V.E.L.A.’s use of Betty Boop’s image.
As previously noted, the court ultimately avoided the hard issues by
ruling that Betty Boop’s image lacked secondary meaning. 233 But the
Ninth Circuit surely will not be so lucky in future cases. Thus, if it is con-

226. See generally Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc., 457 F.3d 1062.
227. See id. at 1074 (“Volkswagen and Audi’s trademarks undoubtedly increase the marketability of Auto Gold’s products. But their ‘entire significance’ lies in the demand for goods
bearing those non-functional marks.”).
228. Id. at 1073.
229. See id. at 1065 (noting the defendant’s argument that consumers who own
Volkswagens or Audis want Volkswagen or Audi license plate covers).
230. Id. at 1071.
231. W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 343–44.
232. See id. at 344 (indicating that there is superficial appeal to the argument of décor
compatibility, but rejecting it as “an open sesame to trademark infringement”).
233. Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 967.
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cerned about the breadth of merchandising rights in beloved media characters, the court will need to formulate other theories besides aesthetic functionality that are more consistent with the role of trademark policies within
the intellectual property system.
Although it did not do so, the court might have tried to apply aesthetic
functionality principles as they were intended—to question whether Betty
Boop’s image could actually serve as a trademark to represent the source of
the films in which she appears. On first blush, one might think that aesthetic
functionality should not limit Betty Boop’s potential trademark status because other media companies have enormous freedom to create other characters to star in their works. However, this is not the end of the inquiry because the appearance of Betty Boop’s character in a film may be the most
important reason that an audience chooses to watch it. In a very real sense,
characters are important to storytelling just as color is important to fashion. 234 One can thus take this as a signal that governing intellectual property
policies perhaps should not provide broad trademark rights to characters.
The problem is that the functionality doctrine was conceived and developed
to address overlaps between the trademark system and patents. 235 Films and
books, however, as opposed to patents, are the subjects of copyrights, 236 so
the principles underlying the functionality doctrine do not directly apply.
Therefore, it is more appropriate to address these issues in view of potential
overlaps and policy conflicts between trademarks and copyrights.
IV. TRADEMARK PROTECTION OF MEDIA CHARACTERS: A PROPOSAL
In its first decision, the Ninth Circuit not only ruled that Art & Vintage Entertainment Licensing Agency, Inc.’s (“A.V.E.L.A.”) use of Betty
Boop’s image was aesthetically functional, but it also concluded that a
trademark action would unduly interfere with copyright policies.237 The
first rationale was clearly wrong, especially in light of the court’s previous
decision in Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., so the
court had good reason to withdraw its original decision. Unfortunately, the
court found a way in its revised opinion to avoid addressing both issues by
concluding that Fleischer provided insufficient proof of secondary mean-

234. Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 454
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
235. See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 164–65; W.T. Rogers Co., 778 F.2d at 338.
236. 2 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 7:21 (2d
ed. 2012).
237. Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. A.V.E.L.A., Inc., 636 F.3d 1115, 1124 (9th Cir. 2011),
withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 2011).
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ing. 238 Since Betty Boop’s character had not attained trademark status, the
court did not have to consider any potential “defenses” to trademark infringement. It certainly would have been more useful, though, if the court
had not skirted the opportunity to provide more guidance in the field.
There is still some lingering concern that the court will resurrect the aesthetic functionality doctrine in future litigation involving well protected and
distinctive character trademarks. What is most unfortunate, though, is that
the court correctly identified a significant problem with character trademarks in light of the Copyright Act, but decided to avoid the issue.
A. The Trademark-Copyright Overlap
The United States Constitution empowers the federal government to
pass laws that give authors exclusive rights to their works for limited periods of time. 239 Accordingly, the federal government passed the Copyright
Act, which provides authors of original expressions with rights against various uses, such as making, displaying, and distributing substantially similar
reproductions. 240 Thus, the maker of a film has tremendous rights to prevent another company from producing a movie that has a substantially similar concept and feel as the original.241 However, that author also can prevent others from making a substantially similar reproduction of a
qualitatively creative component, such as a character’s image. 242 In fact,
the author may enjoy separate copyright privileges in the appearance of the
character itself. 243 The end result is that the Copyright Act effectively provides its full range of protections to distinctive characters, such as Mickey
Mouse or Betty Boop. 244 The copyright owner also enjoys these rights
against almost any conceivable application of the character, whether as a
238. Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 968.
239. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
240. See Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006) (having first passed in 1790 and
amended numerous times thereafter); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY:
FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX (Hill & Wang 1994) (providing an excellent
treatment of the history and purposes of copyrights).
241. See, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562
F.2d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding that McDonaldland commercials were substantially similar
to the H.R. Pufnstuf television show because they captured the total concept and feel of Pufnstuf).
242. See MELVILLE NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03 (1990) (“[E]ven if the
[copied] material is quantitatively small, if it is qualitatively important, the trier of fact may
properly find substantial similarity.”).
243. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 962 (“[C]haracters that are especially distinctive . . . receive protection apart from the copyrighted work.”) (quoting Rice v. Fox Broad. Co.,
330 F.3d 1170, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2003)).
244. See id.
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two-dimensional image on a t-shirt or keychain, or as a three-dimensional
representation on a doll or costume. 245
As required by the Constitution, the Copyright Act limits the duration
of the exclusive rights, 246 albeit for a period that many believe is far too
long. 247 Nonetheless, Congress has deemed the long period necessary to
achieve the copyright’s task of providing authors the appropriate monetary
incentives to develop their creatively artistic works and share them with the
public. 248 As one can imagine, the potential profits from characters may be
enormous, as Disney can use copyright law to control all substantially similar depictions of Mickey Mouse, barring independent creation, which
would be very difficult to prove. 249 But that is the bargain, albeit lucrative,
that the copyright system offered to Disney to encourage it to take the risks
of developing its films and characters, and sharing them with the public.
However, the other part of the bargain is that when a copyright’s period of
exclusivity ends, the public reacquires its fundamental right to free competition, 250 which includes making slavish copies to the minutest detail in
every possible context. If the trademark system allowed authors to extend
the lives of characters that they primarily developed within the sphere of
copyright’s incentive structure, then it would create a clash with the fundamental policy balance that underlies the Copyright Act. In addition, it
would violate the constitutional requirement that the exclusive rights en-

245. See, e.g., Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789 (4th Cir. 2001)
(holding that the copyright on Barney applies to the use of the character in costume); see also 17
U.S.C. §§ 107–22 (providing several exceptions to copyright privileges, most notably one for
fair use).
246. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
247. See generally Elred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (holding that extensions of
copyright are within Congress’s authority).
248. See id. at 205–06 (discussing that Congress has also established a long term of copyright protection to make U.S. law consistent with international copyright treaties).
249. Since copyright infringement requires a reproduction, one suing for copyright infringement must prove that the defendant incorporated protected elements from the copyrighted
work to make the allegedly infringing copy. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc., 562
F.2d at 1164. This hurdle typically is fulfilled by demonstrating that the defendant had access to
the copyrighted work and then created a work having substantially similar expression. See id.
Characters such as Mickey Mouse are so ubiquitously omnipresent that it would be extremely
easy to prove that the defendant had access. See Moffat, supra note 142, at 1507. The burden
would thus shift to the alleged infringer to rebut a presumption of copying and prove independent
creation. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 967 (8th Cir. 2005).
250. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2003)
(“The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain’ under
which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention or
work at will and without attribution.”) (internal citation omitted).
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joyed by these authors be of limited duration, given that trademarks theoretically can last forever.251
Despite these legitimate policy objections, many courts have concluded that trademark protection is appropriate for copyrighted characters to
combat confusion as long as the typical trademark requirements are met. 252
Although Betty Boop ultimately did not make the grade, other characters,
such as Superman and Barney certainly have. 253 Nevertheless, other courts
have perceived the problem with the copyright conflict and, like the Ninth
Circuit, have found other trademark-related reasons to deny protection.254
For example, a California district court noted problems with recognizing
trademark rights in the character Zorro because the original film was “protected by copyright,” but it ultimately reached its conclusion based on insufficient proof of secondary meaning. 255 Likewise, a court was willing to
acknowledge trademark rights in specific illustrations of Peter Rabbit but
questioned whether trademark and unfair competition theories might serve
to protect a character beyond the term of copyright applicable to the underlying work. 256
The time has come for courts to step up to the plate and more actively
defend copyright law’s incentive structure from unwarranted intrusion by
trademarks. The Supreme Court clearly set the tone in TrafFix Devices,
Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. by absolutely prohibiting trademarks for
useful product designs, even when there might be potential confusion or
other ways to compete. 257 In Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp., the Supreme Court also cautioned courts to prevent over-extension
of trademark protection into areas traditionally occupied by copyright.258
The Ninth Circuit certainly was moved by this instruction although it did
not address certain important distinctions.259 For instance, the court did not
251. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
252. See, e.g., Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 803–04; DC Comics, Inc. v. Filmation Assoc., 486
F. Supp. 1273, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
253. See Lyons P’ship, 243 F.3d at 803–04; In re DC Comics, 689 F.2d 1042.
254. See, e.g., Sony Pictures Entm’t v. Fireworks Entm’t Group, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d
1177, 1197 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Frederick Warne & Co., Inc. v. Book Sales, Inc., 481 F. Supp.
1191, 1197 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
255. See, e.g., Sony Pictures Entm’t, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1197; Frederick Warne & Co.,
481 F. Supp. at 1197 n.3.
256. See Frederick Warne & Co., 481 F. Supp. at 1197 n.3.
257. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
258. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33.
259. Compare id. at 38 (holding that Dastar was not liable for reverse passing off by misrepresenting the “origin” of the goods because Dastar, which edited an uncopyrighted film series
and sold the product on its own, actually was the origin of the edited movies), with Fleischer Stu-
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indicate whether its conclusion denying trademark protection for Betty
Boop (based on the copyright conflict) would apply equally to all copyrightable materials or whether Betty Boop was somehow special. 260 Such
clarification is obviously important because the sweeping approach would
prevent trademark protection for any uncopyrighted artistic element of an
identification symbol.
Fortunately, the answer is not all that difficult to formulate. The Supreme Court in Dastar was very clearly focused on authors who first
sought to benefit from copyright’s rewards, and then tried to use the trademark system to increase those rewards.261 It is very unlikely that the Court
would be equally worried when the trademark system protects artistic designs that are primarily developed to serve as identifiers, such as the Nike
Swoosh. 262 In these instances, the designers intend to be rewarded by enhancing the reputation of the company that the trademark identifies—just
what trademarks are supposed to do. 263 In contrast, the creators of the original film in Dastar primarily intended to create a work of authorship, hoping that copyrights would lead to profits. 264 Based on this distinction, one
can conclude that trademark protection is appropriate when copyrightable
materials are developed primarily to serve as trademarks, but should be denied when those materials are created primarily as attributes within works
of authorship. Thus, the trademark/copyright overlap should be governed
by a “primary purpose test.”
Application of the primary purpose test would prohibit trademark protection for most media characters, including Betty Boop and Mickey
Mouse, even under circumstances that might result in customer confusion.

dios, Inc., 636 F.3d at 1118, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d 958 (finding that Fleischer’s
suit claims that A.V.E.L.A., by displaying Betty Boop, is confusing consumers into thinking that
Fleischer is the origin or sponsor, which it is not).
260. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 636 F.3d at 1124, withdrawn and superseded, 654 F.3d
958 (“[W]here a copyright is in the public domain, a party may not assert a trademark infringement action against an alleged infringer if that action is essentially a substitute for a copyright
infringement action.” Based on this, the court initially ruled that Fleischer could not succeed on a
trademark infringement claim since Betty Boop might then never enter the public domain.).
261. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 34 (stating that Twentieth Century Fox’s attempt to
use trademark laws to prevent Dastar from copying its film “would create a species of mutant
copyright law that limits the public’s ‘federal right to copy and to use,’ expired copyrights.”) (internal quotations omitted).
262. See, e.g., Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 205 (1985)
(holding that a trademark including a logo of an airplane was incontestable).
263. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (clarifying this principle by defining a trademark as
“any word, name, symbol or device intended to be used to identify and distinguish [a producer’s]
goods.”) (emphasis added).
264. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 25–26.
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Although some scholars have questioned the propriety of trademark protection for media characters, most typically approve of it, but with limitations. 265 Few would deny trademark status to Mickey Mouse, even after
the copyright expires. 266 The primary purpose test, though, would prevent
Disney from enjoying trademark rights in Mickey Mouse from the very
start. The consequence is not really all that important while the copyright
is maintained, since no other company may legally display a substantially
similar image, except under limited circumstances. And of course, the term
of copyright protection has somewhat recently been lengthened to ninetyfive years. 267 However, after the copyright ends, other companies would
generally be free to display Mickey Mouse or similar media characters in
any way that they choose. 268 Having said this, it is important to recognize
that trademark status would be available for some media characters, but only those that were primarily developed to serve as identifiers for goods and
services. Tony the Tiger, for instance, provides one striking example, since
the character was primarily created to identify Kellogg’s Frosted Flakes. 269
Although explicit adoption of the primary purpose test to address the
trademark/copyright overlap would be a new approach, the concept has
been used by courts to address trademark issues in other contexts. For instance, in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., the Second Circuit addressed
copyright and trademark infringement claims involving two sweater designs having a “fall” motif that consisted of seasonal elements such as
leaves, acorns, and squirrels on muted colors.270 The court determined that
the defendant violated the Copyright Act by selling sweaters with a sub-

265. See, e.g., Moffat, supra note 142, at 1531–32 (claiming that Congress needs to more
directly address overlapping protection by copyright and trademark, by perhaps requiring a company to elect between copyrights and trademarks for protection); Richter, supra note 144, at 442
(claiming that the conflict should be addressed by revising the fair use doctrine in copyright);
Helfand, supra note 73, at 670–71 (claiming that using trademarks on the product is presumed not
to infringe, assuming the seller includes a disclaimer, but using the character on tags or labels
does infringe. However, when famous characters such as Mickey Mouse are used on the product,
one cannot presume that this does not infringe trademark rights.).
266. See Helfand, supra note 73, at 671.
267. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat
2827 (extending copyright protection for works made for hire by twenty years). In other instances, the term may be measured as the life of the author plus seventy years. 17 U.S.C. § 302.
268. An exception is for consistent use of individual images that are primarily developed
and used to represent Disney as the source. Supra notes 232–33.
269. See The Advertising Century: Tony the Tiger, ADVERTISING AGE (Mar. 29, 1999),
http://adage.com/century/icon09.html. Tony the Tiger was created in 1951 to serve as the official
mascot for the Kellogg Company’s Sugar Frosted Flakes cereal (subsequently renamed Frosted
Flakes). Id.
270. Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996 (2d Cir. 1995).
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stantially similar appearance. 271 However, the court rejected the trademark
claim, stating: “As Knitwaves’ objective in the two sweater designs was
primarily aesthetic, the designs were not primarily intended as source identification.” 272 Likewise, since the objective in creating media characters is
primarily aesthetic (that is, for copyright-related purposes) and not primarily for source identification, trademark protection should be denied.
Despite this ruling, some observers believe that the Supreme Court
legitimized trademark protection for primarily aesthetic elements in WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 273 which also involved sweater designs. 274 However, this conclusion is incorrect. In the Samara litigation,
the appeals court determined that Samara purposefully designed its entire
line of seersucker children’s clothes with consistent elements so that the
look would be identified with Samara. 275 Thus, it distinguished the result
in Knitwaves because Knitwaves’ objective was primarily aesthetic whereas Samara’s goal was primarily motivated by source identification.276 For
this reason, the underlying facts should have created little concern for the
Supreme Court about overlapping protection.
The approaches used to address the other forms of intellectual property system overlaps also support use of the primary purpose test to address
trademarks for media characters. For instance, as we have seen, the courts
recognize that dual protection for copyrights and patents is only appropriate
if the copyright purposes are primary, or if the aesthetic elements are devised without function (the patent purposes) in mind. 277 Also, in the computer context, courts have scaled back the degree of overlap by requiring
filtration of elements that primarily serve patent-related purposes. 278 Likewise, in the trademark/copyright context, courts should filter out those ele-

271. See id. at 1002–05.
272. Id. at 1009.
273. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
274. Moffat, supra note 142, at 1527 (stating that “it is clear that the Supreme Court is not
offended by the notion of overlapping protection” because the Court did not reject the trademark
claim in Samara).
275. Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’d
on other grounds, 529 U.S. 205 (finding that the facts are distinguishable from Knitwaves because the clothing line used consistent design elements specifically to identify Samara and build
brand loyalty).
276. See Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 212.
277. See, e.g, Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 421–22 (2d Cir.
1985) (Newman, J., dissenting); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142,
1144 (2d Cir. 1987).
278. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992);
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l. Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815–18 (1st Cir. 1995).
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ments, such as characters, that are primarily intended to advance the stories
in films.
In addition, the principles that have been adopted in the trademark/patent context support the relevance of the primary purpose test with
copyrights. First and foremost, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
the goals of the patent and copyright systems trump confusion. 279 Thus,
strict rules, such as the primary purpose test, are appropriate even if some
confusion will result. Beyond this general notion, the Court confirmed the
dominance of patents over trademarks by preventing trademark protection
of product design elements that primarily serve functional ends or are an
important reason for purchase.280 Again, analogous dominance principles
should apply to media characters that are primarily developed within the
context of a creative film or other copyrightable work.
Although the primary purpose test will foreclose the general appearance of media characters from trademark protection, this does not mean that
copyright owners cannot obtain trademark protection for individual images
of characters that they consistently use on products or services to identify
source. For instance, Flesicher should not have been able to claim trademark protection for Betty Boop, even if the character did have secondary
meaning, because she was primarily created in the 1930s as the centerpiece
of a cartoon.281 Nevertheless, Fleischer could still consistently use a particular image of Betty Boop to represent the original source of the film and
other products made or authorized by the company. The rights in this
trademark would be very thin and would only extend to the distinctive elements that can be conceptually separated from the general appearance of
Betty Boop. 282 In other words, trademark rights in a particular Betty Boop
image, for instance with crossed legs and a yellow garment, would not prevent other companies from generally displaying Betty Boop, but they might

279. See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 34–35 (“[The Lanham Act] does not protect
trade dress in a functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage the
public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufacturer or seller.”); W.T.
Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he concept of functionality is intended to screen out from the protection of trademark law certain design features even if they
have become so far identified with the manufacturer of a particular brand that consumers may be
confused about the origin of the good if another producer is allowed to adopt the feature.”); see
also Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 33–34.
280. See supra notes 124–34.
281. See Fleischer Studios, Inc., 654 F.3d at 961.
282. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (articulating the notion of thin rights in intellectual property, explaining that the copyright in a compilation of facts
was “thin” since it only extended to the creative selection and arrangement of facts, and not to the
facts themselves).
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not be able to include crossed legs and a yellow garment if consumers, over
time, come to recognize those elements as source identifiers. One district
court adopted this concept with regard to Peter Rabbit when it accepted
trademark rights in particular images but not necessarily in the character itself. 283 It also would conform to trademark policy regarding identifiers that
include un-protectable elements, such as generic words or images. For instance, the Coca-Cola Company has trademark rights to Coca-Cola; 284 nonetheless, other companies are free to use the word “cola” as long as they
don’t combine it with other terms that are confusingly similar to “coca.” 285
B. Media Characters and the Analogy to Celebrities
Media characters have such a ubiquitous role in modern society that they
perhaps should be treated in many ways like famous celebrities. The analogy
is particularly insightful because the trademark treatment of celebrities leads
to results that are consistent with the proposed primary purpose test.
Several celebrities have claimed that their general appearance should
serve as a trademark, essentially representing their own persona or the services that they provide.286 In a case involving Tiger Woods, the Sixth Circuit noted that the celebrity was asking to be treated as a “walking, talking
trademark,” so that all uses of any image would constitute trademark infringement. 287 According to the Sixth Circuit, “this is an untenable
claim,” 288 holding that “as a general rule, a person’s image or likeness cannot function as a trademark.” 289 This conclusion followed the precedent set
in previous cases involving Elvis Presley and Babe Ruth, in which the
courts made the same determination.290 One may argue that media characters are different because they do not simply represent themselves, but also
the works with which they appear. This claim, however, is not compelling.
For instance, the Sixth Circuit relied on the celebrity cases to conclude that
283. See Frederick Warne & Co., 481 F. Supp. at 1197 n.3.
284. COCA-COLA, Registration No. 0022406.
285. See, e.g., PEPSI-COLA, Registration No. 0349886 (reciting PepsiCo’s federal trademark registration for PEPSI-COLA); see also AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 351
(9th Cir. 1979) (in comparing Sleekcraft with Slickcraft, the court noted that “craft” is frequently
used with boats and thus is not protectable, but that the difference between “Slick” and “Sleek”
was insufficient to overcome the overall similarity).
286. See Pirone v. MacMillan, Inc., 894 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1990); Estate of Presley v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1344 (D.N.J. 1981).
287. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 922 (6th Cir. 2003).
288. Id. at 922.
289. Id.
290. See Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1344; Pirone, 894 F.2d at 581.
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images of the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame could not represent the museum’s services as a trademark. 291
Having said this, these cases do recognize that there is an exception to
the general rule barring trademark status for celebrities—when a particular
image is used consistently to designate source. 292 For instance, in a dispute
involving Elvis Presley, the court determined that one particular image of
Presley had been consistently used with the advertising and sale of Elvis
Presley entertainment services to identify those services and could be protected as a trademark. 293 On the other hand, Tiger Woods did not allege that
any particular photograph had been consistently used on specific goods, and
therefore his trademark claim was denied.294 This again supports the notion
that the trademark system should not be available to protect media characters in general, but that it could provide rights to specific distinctive images
of characters that are consistently used to identify a source.295
V. CONCLUSION
In the Betty Boop litigation, the Ninth Circuit broached an important
subject regarding trademark rights for media characters. To honor the respective economic roles of trademarks and copyrights, trademark rights
should only be available for media characters that are primarily created for
source identification purposes. 296 At first blush, this may seem to be troubling news for companies such as Disney, which will lose copyright protection for their film stars relatively soon. However, they still can develop
goodwill in particular images to identify and distinguish themselves in the
marketplace.297 Also, any worry about potential confusion is certainly
291. See Rock & Roll Hall of Fame & Museum, Inc. v. Gentile Prods., 134 F.3d 749, 755
(6th Cir. 1998).
292. See Pirone, 894 F.2d 579; Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. 1339.
293. Estate of Presley, 513 F. Supp. at 1363–64.
294. See ETW Corp., 332 F.3d at 923.
295. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (establishing that celebrities cannot
protect their general appearances as trademarks, but they do have the ability to bring false endorsement claims under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and right of publicity claims under state
law); see also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 (1979) (state laws protecting the
right of publicity vary slightly in their terms, but in general protect the unauthorized “appropriation, for defendant’s advantage, of the plaintiff’s name and likeness.” Such personal rights, as
opposed to trademark rights, are not relevant to media characters, for if they were, A.V.E.L.A.
would need to get permission from Betty Boop to put her image on merchandise).
296. Supra Part IV.A.
297. See W.T. Rogers, Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 347–48 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that
the loss of trademark rights “is not a disaster for the owner of a trademark.” If the trademark
owner has to share the design, it can “imprint a verbal or other trademark more emphatically, in
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misplaced. Once consumers recognize that media characters cannot serve
as identifiers, they will rely on the symbols that do function legally as
trademarks. Thus, customers who specifically want a filmmaker’s products
will seek the logos and tags that bear its legitimately protected marks. The
end result thus serves to preserve the independent roles of copyrights and
trademarks without raising any serious risk of market confusion.

order to identify its brand to consumers who can no longer look to the . . . [design] for identification of source.”).

